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ABSTRACT
For many years, managers have chosen to ignore the risks associated with acts of terrorism
that can potentially and catastrophically affect the global supply chain. As producers and
suppliers become more tightly tied through long term relationships, common communications
and information technology, events affecting one member of the supply chain can have a
profound impact on the ability of the rest of the network to operate. The purpose of this
discourse is to highlight the linkages which leave a supply chain vulnerable in the case of
direct or indirect disruption caused by unexpected terrorist activity.
Headlines proclaim “Despite Demonstrations
and Terrorism Fears, Commerce Continues”
(Pope 2000). For how long? What now? Is your
supply chain vulnerable to disruptions due to
terrorist activity?
What kinds of terrorist
activities are likely to disrupt supply chain
operations?
Many in the United States have long considered
terrorism as something that happens somewhere
else to someone else. To a great extent that
belief has been supported. Recent terrorist
activity in the U.S. has been confined to a few
high profile cases such as the Atlanta, Oklahoma
City, and World Trade Center bombings. Many

have chosen to forget the events that occurred
domestically and world-wide during the Viet
Nam War. However, Stephen W. Brooks of the
Treasury Department, a leading expert on anti
terrorist training and planning, has commented
that he expects the number of terrorist attacks in
the U.S. to increase (Fabey 1998). Even more
frightening is the observation that terrorists can
take as much time as necessary to determine the
appropriate target and make plans for the
attack. Weapons, whether some form of firearm
or the more difficult to detect biological variety,
are easily obtained on the street or through the
Internet.
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According to Brooks, businesses, especially big
companies doing business with the government,
have become a primary target. Raids on some
terrorist groups have revealed plans for attacks
on ports, rails, and other transportation facilities
and networks. Such attacks would provide high
visibility and extensive disruption, furthering the
objectives of the terrorist group. The reality of
such threats prompted President Clinton to
declare war on terrorism.
The maritime
community, with a long history of dealing with
terrorist activity in the form of pirates, hijackers,
and smugglers, has expressed a growing concern
that it is only a matter of time before a port, ship,
or related facility becomes a target of a terrorist
attack.
In view of the mounting level of concern
regarding the potential for disruption of private
and business activity by terrorist activity, the
question that may be asked is whether reality
supports that concern (Patterns of Global
Terrorism 1999). During the years 1994 through

1999, statistics substantiate the concerns
expressed regarding terrorist activity (Table 1).
A review of these statistics reveals that
businesses, targeted 1,589 times during this fiveyear period, are subject to terrorist attacks in far
greater numbers than any other category.
While there are undoubtedly many explanations
for the targeting of any given business, the
question for transportation and logistics
professionals is, “What effect will this have on
my company as we seek to meet strategic and
customer service objectives,” followed closely by,
“What can be done to reduce the potential
vulnerability in the supply chain?”
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
In an attempt to develop an understanding of the
potential points of vulnerability in the supply
chain it is necessary to examine both the
logistical functions within the firm and

TABLE 1
TOTAL FACILITIES STRUCK BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS:
1994-1999
Year

Business

Diplomatic

Government

Military

Other

1994

130

24

27

5

126

1995

338

22

20

4

126

1996

236

24

12

6

90

1997

327

30

11

4

80

1998

282

35

10

4

67

1999

276

59

27

17

95

Total

1,589

194

107

40

584

Adapted from:_____, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999,” Department of State
Publication 10678, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, April 2000, Appendix C Statistical Review, p. 104.
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throughout the supply chain. Previous studies
have investigated various aspects of the supply
chain related to the most efficient operational
considerations when moving revenue traffic
(cargo and passengers). In one such study
(Cavinato 1992), a model of twenty basic cost and
value elements is developed which are used to
define ten key strategic and management areas.
Yet, not a single element in the list of twenty cost
and value elements or the list of ten key strategic
and management areas refers to the enormous
costs, financial and human, that could result
from terrorist activities directed toward the firm
or the environment in which it operates.
A study conducted by Hsu and El-Najdawi (1991)
examined the safety stock/lot sizing relationship.
Results indicated that total production costs were
determined by the number of set-ups, inventories
carried, and the frequency of shortages that were
the result of the lot size/safety stock relationship.
Though it represents a fairly definitive study of
four safety stock policies, it provides no reference
to the implications of terrorism on safety stock
policy decision making.
Modal selection and carrier choice criteria were
the objectives of a study by Foster and Strasser
(1990). Variables such as costs, transit time,
negotiable rates, negotiable service, reliability,
frequency of service, claims settlement,
equipment availability, electronic data
processing, quality of sales personnel, and
warehousing capabilities were elements of
importance to both carriers and shippers.
However, elements such as vulnerability to
terrorist activity were not mentioned by either
carriers or shippers as being a consideration in
the selection of carrier or mode. In a related
study, the selection of mode and port for
international logistics was investigated. Neither
vulnerability to terrorist activity nor contingency
alternatives to continue port activities were
mentioned as selection criteria (Min and Galle
1996).
The examination of routing and scheduling by
Ronald Ballou (1990) did not take into
consideration the effects of extraneous elements

such as the probability of terrorist disruption.
Instead the emphasis was restricted to the
minimization of miles traveled and vehicles used
when developing a methodology for routing and
scheduling.
Kathleen Allen (1991) examined the role of
logistics in the overseas plant selection process.
This study examined the importance of corporate
and/or environmental characteristics in execu
tive’s perceptions of the importance of logistics as
overseas production facility acquisition was
considered. While factors such as product type,
revenue size, number of overseas production
facilities, technological production sophistication,
foreign market growth objectives, and the
relative costs of distribution were considered, the
probability of terrorist activity was not a factor
for consideration.
The impact of inventory centralization was
examined in an effort to determine the need to
change the number of stocking locations based on
the nature and magnitude of the uncertainty
with which a firm is faced (Tallon 1993).
Uncertainty in this research is restricted to
demand uncertainty. No consideration is given
to the need to reduce the uncertainty resulting
from the probability of terrorist activity.
The importance of developing close vendor ties
for the successful implementation of integrated
logistics management and just-in-time inventory
systems was the subject of a study by Thomas
Harrington, et. al. (1991). In this study, a
methodology for the evaluation of vendor
performance was developed. This tool would be
used by managers to formally evaluate vendors
for the purpose of determining the most desirable
vendors with which to develop long term
relationships, identifying problems needing
corrective action, and gaining productivity
improvements. None of the criteria identified
related to the impact of terrorist targeting of the
supplier and/or its operating environment.
In addition to studies of the individual elements
of logistics activity, studies of international
logistics management such as that by Morgan
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59

and Arnold (1991) have been conducted.
Terrorism is not a topic of consideration in
overall studies just as it has not been considered
in studies focusing on individual elements of the
logistics activity.

Location
Location is a major element of supply chain
design. From the determination of production
facility and warehouse/distribution center
location for maximum market coverage by
shippers, to the determination of the most
efficient location of terminal facilities and most
direct route by carriers, location has always been
one of the most important factors in the decision.
Location is also an identifiable indicator of the
probability of terrorist activity (Table 2).

IMPACT ON SUPPLY CHAIN
DESIGN AND COMPOSITION
No matter the product category, size, country of
origin, or any number of other factors, firms of all
descriptions are reaching out to markets in all
parts of the world. As they reach into these
arenas, the strength and reliability of the supply
chain becomes of exponential importance. From
Alexander the Great to Amazon.com, history is
replete with examples of the impact of supply
chain operations on the ability to accomplish
planned strategic objectives.

From this table it can be seen that terrorist
attacks are a fact of life in most parts of the
world. It is important to remember that, like a
stone tossed into a quiet lake, each attack creates
a pattern of disruption that continues to be an
issue even after the initial event.
These

TABLE 2
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS BY REGION
1994 - 1999
Year

Africa

Asia

Eurasia

Latin
America

Middle
East

North
America

Western
Europe

1994

25

24

11

58

116

0

88

1995

10

16

29

5

45

0

272

1996

11

11

24

84

45

0

121

1997

11

21

42

128

37

13

52

1998

21

49

14

111

31

0

48

1999

52

72

35

121

25

2

85

Total

130

193

131

594

299

15

666

Adapted from:_____, “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999,” Department of State
Publication 10678, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism, April 2000, Appendix C Statistical Review, p. 102.
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disruptions are related to the actual destruction
of facilities and infrastructure as well as the
continued fear of further attack which affects the
behavior of those involved.
When taking an integrated supply chain
perspective, location becomes even more of an
issue. No longer is the element of risk restricted
to the facilities and personnel under the direct
control of the company. From the shipper’s
perspective, locational risk considerations
include the location of suppliers (first, second,
and even third tier), inventory storage and
distribution center placement, carriers and
carrier routes selection, and customer location.

TABLE 3
ANTI-U.S. TERRORIST
ATTACKS BY REGION
1999
Region

Number of
Anti-US
Attacks

Latin America

96

North America

1

Asia

6

Eurasia

9

Middle East

11

Africa

16

Western Europe

30

Contingency Planning
Managers at all levels of the supply chain must
face the reality of terrorist activity and its
potential impact on supply chain operations.
Partner selection must include an evaluation of
the ability of that partner to perform, even in the
event of terrorist generated disruption, just as
they are expected to perform in the event of
natural disasters and other unplanned events.
However, unlike a natural disaster in which
those affected are simply a matter of chance,
terrorist activity is often specifically targeted
(Table 3). This means that several links in the
supply chain may be affected simultaneously,
either directly as a result of the actual event, or
indirectly as a result of facility/infrastructure
destruction, or human casualties (Table 4).
The development of contingency plans is the
responsibility of all members of the supply chain.
Because of the need for integration, these plans
must not only cover all aspects of firm operations
communication links between the individual
members. Just as the growth of ERP programs
purports to more tightly tie supply chain
members into an integrated information
network, the vulnerability of all members of that
network to IT sabotage is increased.

169

Total

Adapted from:_____, “Patterns of
Global Terrorism 1999,” Department
of State Publication 10678, Office of
the Secretary of State, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
April 2000, Appendix C Statistical
Review, p. 106.
Note:

Includes attacks against U.S.
facilities and attacks in which
U.S. citizens suffered
casualties.

Impact of the Internet
The increased use of the Internet for commerce,
whether consumer or business oriented, has had
a tremendous impact on affected firms. Just as
firms developed the logistics techniques
necessary to implement JIT strategies, they must
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TABLE 4
U.S. CASUALTIES INCURRED IN
ANTI-U.S. TERRORIST ATTACKS
1999
Organization

Number of
Casualties

Government

7

Military

9

Diplomat

9

Business

133

Other

26

Total

184

Adapted from:_____, “Patterns of
Global Terrorism 1999,” Department
of State Publication 10678, Office of
the Secretary of State, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
April 2000, Appendix C Statistical
Review, p. 106.
Note:

Includes attacks against U.S.
facilities and attacks in which
U.S. citizens suffered
casualties.

their use of the communication potential of the
Web, and made greater use of faster
transportation modes—specifically air.
As
shipments get smaller, and increased use is
made of small package carriers, security becomes
more of an issue. At this time, small package
carriers are caught between the need to maintain
shipper privacy and the need to provide security
for individual shipments and for their facilities
and personnel in the aggregate. In fact, most
small package carriers, particularly the USPS,
require a search warrant before packages can be
opened by law enforcement officials (Brooks
2000).
Another factor to be considered is that, if security
is a responsibility of the shipper, many of the
small “dot corn’s” and other firms using the
Internet as a mechanism to reach a global
market are unaware of the scope of such an
undertaking and/or do not have the financial
resources to accomplish the task. If security, of
both the package and the contents is the respon
sibility of the carrier, then the carrier’s personnel
are converted into some type of unofficial
enforcement army which would be an
unacceptable situation. Couple this with the
incredible number of small packages handled on
an hourly basis, and the potential for terrorist
penetration is greatly increased.
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS

now further refine those techniques to respond to
an Internet-based operating environment. To be
specific, JIT requirements of smaller, more
frequent deliveries and shipments, have now
become requirements for faster deliveries and
shipments at the single-item level on a world
wide basis. This has entailed the development of
multiple channels using carriers capable of
handling smaller sized shipments with a global
reach.
To accomplish this herculean task, carriers have
formed international alliances, made increased
investments in information technology, increased
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The need for supply chains having the greatest
potential to operate even in the event of
unexpected terrorist activity directed toward the
shipper, carrier, customer, or the operating
environment is the responsibility of all parties
involved. While the specific methods chosc-n by
any individual entity may differ, the objectives
must remain the same—to deliver the quality of
product and performance that meets customer
needs and company objectives. In order to
accomplish these objectives, managers must take
the initiative and scrutinize existing plans and
processes in an effort to identify and strengthen
those linkages that are especially vulnerable to
terrorist disruption.

Shippers
Over the years, as firms have designed supply
chains for competitive advantage and increased
efficiencies, the emphasis has been on decreased
numbers of suppliers, increased cooperation with
suppliers on everything from forecasting to
product development, and decreased inventory
levels with increased inventory flow at all levels
of the supple chain. The ultimate objective is to
deliver the greatest level of customer satisfaction
in the most efficient and cost effective manner
possible. The greatest effort has been focused on
the internal processes and procedures needed to
facilitate the accomplishment of these goals.
The end result has been supply chains which
encircle the globe. Suppliers, customers and
manufacturing and storage/distribution facilities
have been located to take advantage of reduced
costs in manufacturing, transportation, and
inventory carrying costs. Increased use of joint
purchasing has resulted in reduced costs. All of
these individual entities are connected with
information technology links from bar coding to
track inventory, to Internet ordering, payment,
tracking and tracing, to ERP systems intended to
coordinate inventory levels and production rates
to meet but not exceed customer needs. In order
to produce this new “lean, mean” supply chain, in
many cases, redundancy has been rooted out of
the system.
With the greater global reach and lack of
redundancy in the system, new criteria must be
included when making supply chain design
decisions. New criteria for vendor selection
must include the ability to operate in the event of
terrorist activity, location, and the identity of the
carriers and routes used to transport products.
Location and safety stock levels are a second area
of concern. Location decisions must include a
consideration of the risk factor involved when
locating facilities, serving customers, and/or
using vendors who are located in areas subject to
a higher probability of terrorist disruption.
When making safety stock decisions, the
likelihood of supply interruption based on vendor

location and carrier selection and routes must be
considered.
The level of interdependency
between vendors must be scrutinized. There is
an increased vulnerability in the event that
supply is disrupted to all the dependent vendors.
Therefore, the vulnerability of the common
supplier to disruptive activity must be assessed.
All of these factors affect the level of safety stock
that must be carried.
IT decisions must be made with recognition that
an intentional corruption of the system can affect
all elements of the supply chain. A criterion for
IT system selection, then, should be the ability of
the system to resist corruption attempts as well
as the ease with which the results of system
sabotage can be identified and corrected. As the
supply chain becomes more IT dependent, the
question becomes whether it is able to operate
through an alternative system if necessary.
Carriers
Carriers are faced with their own need to protect
their ability to operate in the event of terrorist
disruption. Internal considerations might range
from supplier selection for items such as tires
and fuel to the vulnerability of information and
GPS systems. The location and security of
terminal facilities is an important consideration
for personnel, equipment, and cargo in transit.
The decision as to shipper selection is an
important one. Factors which should come under
consideration include location of shipper
facilities, location of the shipper’s customers, and
the routes that must be taken to serve these
customers. Just as important is the choice of
partners in alliances designed to extend
geographic coverage and service offerings.
Route decisions involve the choice of port,
terminal, and air facilities in addition to the
actual road or trackage that might be used.
Terrorist activity can and has affected the ability
of carriers to make use of such facilities, thus
disrupting more than one level in a supply chain
and/or multiple supply chains.
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CONCLUSIONS
There will always be a question of cost vs. benefit
when reassessing and redesigning a supply
chain. The primary emphasis during this process
is most commonly on cost reduction. However,
reducing the immediate and long term effects
that can result from terrorist disruptions does
not come without costs. Companies pay high
insurance costs to protect their executives who
are targets of terrorist kidnapping. There are
additional costs for body guards, drivers, and
bullet proof automobiles. The objective is to
protect that managerial expertise and prevent
the disruption of operating and strategic
activities. Insurance costs for facilities and for
inventory stored in more politically unstable
locations are substantially higher. How do these
costs compare to the costs of “bullet proofing”
systems and facilities? How does the cost of the
judicious use of built-in redundancy compare to
the cost of operational disruption and the
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